Who’s afraid of a third question?
Reaction to a third option on the ballot paper in the event of an independence referendum has been instructive. Opponents, including some who have supported a multi-option referendum previously, have focused on three main arguments:
- the third option has had its day and time has moved on
- a third option would not provide a clear and decisive outcome
- it is unclear what the third option is.
Who’s afraid of a third question?
Reaction to a third option on the ballot paper in the event of an independence referendum has been instructive. Opponents, including some who have supported a multi-option referendum previously, have focused on three main arguments:
- the third option has had its day and time has moved on
- a third option would not provide a clear and decisive outcome
- it is unclear what the third option is.
The strangest of all arguments is that the third option has had its chance. It has even been argued that it was on the ballot paper in 2014 in a curious effort to rewrite history. If the argument that an option has already been put to the people in a referendum relatively recently is to be taken seriously, then independence should not be on the ballot paper but some version of more powers has still to have its chance. If the argument that there ‘has been a significant and material change in circumstances since the 2014’ has validity then it cannot be restricted to the one option that has already been tested.
Back in 2012, Lesley Riddoch noted what she saw as the real reason that a third option was not going to be on the ballot paper in 2014, ‘A third option has been excluded for one reason only: it would win hands down.’ It would be foolish to predict the outcome of any future referendum but there is little doubt that opponents fear that such an option would allow people to express their first preference and draw support away from their second preference.
The crude binary referendum limits choice. It forces many people to opt for what they see as the least worst option and not for the best option. Democracy would be the real loser if an option likely to have widespread support was excluded.
The argument that a third option muddies the water and would prevent a clear result emerging falls for similar reasons. It is clear that the 2014 binary referendum did little to resolve the issue. There have been over 100 multi-option referendums held across the world and many lessons have been learned as to how best to ensure choice with a clear decisive outcome. The recent referendum on whether to replace the corrupt Pinochet referendum in Chile is a case in point. Only three months ago, Chileans were offered three choices in a referendum. They were asked whether they supported a mechanism to reform the constitution and, simultaneously, in the event that a majority agreed how this should be done – either a directly elected constitutional convention or a partly directly and indirectly elected convention. In other words, the Pinochet constitution; a changed constitution by an elected constitutional convention; and a changed constitution by a mixed convention. Voters overwhelmingly endorsed change and a directly elected convention by 78% and 79% respectively. By posing three options in a series of binary questions it is possible to arrive at a clear result and one that provides more choice.
Unlike the other two criticisms, the third has some validity. If a third option is to be on the ballot paper then it will need to be defined at least in broad terms. For lack of a better term, we will refer to this as ‘More Powers’ though radical or progressive federalism are terms being used in debates in Wales and elsewhere. The status quo has an advantage in not requiring definition but any case for change must be clarified. This applies to independence which requires a complete overhaul since 2014 given the case for reopening the question rests so heavily on ‘significant and material change’ in circumstances. Brexit has indeed altered the debate substantially. It has highlighted divergent opinions north and south of the border but it has also thrown up major new challenges that supporters of independence have generally ignored. The argument that there would be a hard border between Scotland and the rest of the UK was grossly overstated in 2014 assuming, as seemed fair at the time, that Scotland and rUK would remain in the European Union. But the prospect of rUK leaving and Scotland joining the EU means that this border becomes very real. The economic and fiscal challenges in light of the pandemic also require to be addressed. It is clear that there are deep divisions amongst supporters of independence on these matters and these will need to be resolved and explained before any referendum.
But so too with the third option. In 2011, supporters of more powers and supporters of independence were equally clear in what they wanted in broad terms. The Scottish Government’s independence white paper of November 2013 filled in many gaps and provided a reasonable outline, albeit one that could be and was contested, of what independence would mean. This was a lengthy document despite the repetition and rhetorical padding. It will be incumbent on both change options to come up with more detail than currently exists. This should not be rushed. There was no incentive to provide detail for a third option in 2014 as it had been excluded from the ballot paper. But there is no reason why this could not be done.
Other arguments against a third option apply with any change option. The notion that a third option would require Westminster’s approval has some foundation but so too would having a simple binary referendum, a point that supporters of independence struggle to grapple with.
Few people seriously expect a referendum in 2021. Some politicians have asserted that a 2021 referendum is still likely some time this year but this seems designed to win the hearts of some SNP and independence activists. In their heads, these same politicians must know this is highly unlikely. We do not want a repeat of the rushed Brexit referendum which prevented proper deliberation on a complex matter. This is a matter that requires to be addressed with as much information and with options analysed, tested and challenged thoroughly.
The case for a third option would widen and enrich debate. Having a third option on the ballot paper does not presuppose the outcome but the case for a three-option referendum is based on the principle of self-government.
Whether this leads to reforms across the UK will depend on the outcome of the referendum and views of people in rUK. But there is no reason to hold back on reforms in Scotland which, if Scots vote for a third option, could lead the way to a radical overhaul of the constitution as a whole. Support for a third option would not be dependent on an overhaul but would make it more likely to happen especially combined with the growing awareness of and grievances about the UK’s highly centralised and dysfunctional system.
Chilean way:
- Put status quo vs change
- If status quo defeats both change options (independence/more powers) then status quo wins
- If status quo defeats one change option (independence) but other change option (more powers) defeats status quo then the winning change option (more powers) has it
- If both change options defeat status quo then these two options are put up against each other (independence vs more powers)
But an alternative way which may be better in Scottish case:
First question:
Do you want to change the powers of self-government in Scotland?:
Yes [ ]
No [ ] tick one box
Second question:
If there is to be change which would you prefer:
Independence [ ]
More Powers (as agreed) [ ] tick box of your preferred option
If ‘No’ wins the first question, then the status quo continues. If ‘Yes’ wins, the second votes are counted.
These options avoid a situation in which, say, 36% vote for more powers; 34% for independence and 30% of status quo (or whatever combination) and winner hasn’t got 50%. It can offer more choice and a clear, unequivocal result.